

Message Text

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
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AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
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AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 00720

FOR EMBASSY CAPE TOWN

E.O. 11652:GDS
TAGS: PORG, SF, WA
SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: DRAFT TALKING POINTS FOR INFORMAL
MEETING WITH BOTHA

FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS WERE DRAFTED BY CONTACT GROUP
AD REFERENDUM MARCH 1 FOR USE BY CAPE TOWN AMBASSADORS
IN PROPOSED INFORMAL MEETING WITH SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN
MINISTER BOTHA: (FOR CAPE TOWN: PLEASE PASS TEXT TO
CANADIAN COLLEAGUES.)

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QM WE WANTED TO HAVE AN INFORMAL TALK WITH YOU TODAY
ABOUT NAMIBIA. OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY
THE STATEMENTS YOU HAVE MADE, SINCE YOUR RETURN FROM
NEW YORK, ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF URGING AN INTERNATIONAL
LY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT; WE HAVE ALSO WELCOMED YOUR
ASSURANCES THAT THE PROCESS OF SEEKING SUCH AN AGREEMENT
IS CONTINUING. WE HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE USEFUL

EXCHANGE WHICH WE HAVE HAD WITH MR. FOURIE IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS ON THE CLARIFICATION OF LANGUAGE OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF OUR PROPOSAL. WE THINK THAT THIS EXCHANGE HAS SERVED TO NARROW THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR PROPOSAL AND THE POSITION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. YOU HAVE IDENTIFIED FIVE POINTS WHICH STILL REMAIN UNRESOLVED BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE FIVE. THESE ARE:

- I. SIZE, DISPOSITION AND COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWAL OF REMAINING SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES.
- II THE SIZE AND FUNCTION OF UNTAG.
- III RELEASE OF DETAINEES.
- IV MECHANISM FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES.
- V THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ELECTION DATE.

2. YOU YOURSELF, HOWEVER, WOULD PROBABLY AGREE THAT THERE ARE ONLY THREE MAJOR ISSUES, NAMELY, I, II AND IV ABOVE. (THE QUESTION OF THE MECHANISM FOR SETTLING DISPUTES IS PART OF THE MORE GENERAL QUESTION OF THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL AND THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.)

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3. WE SHOULD LIKE TO COMMENT BRIEFLY ON THE TWO LESSER POINTS. AS REGARDS THE ELECTION DATE (V ABOVE), OUR OWN INFORMATION SUGGESTS THAT NO MAJOR PARTY WITHIN NAMIBIA NOW FAVOURS AN EARLY ELECTION BECAUSE THEY ALL WANT AN ADEQUATE AMOUNT OF TIME FOR CAMPAIGNING. IN ANY CASE, ALL THE STEPS NECESSARY TO BRING ABOUT A FREE AND FAIR POLITICAL PROCESS WILL TAKE TIME. WE HAVE VERY MUCH IN MIND THE NEED TO BRING NAMIBIA TO INDEPENDENCE AT AN EARLY DATE, AND WE RECOGNISE THAT IF THIS IS TO BE ACHIEVED WE MUST PRESS AHEAD AS FAST AS POSSIBLE WITH OUR PROPOSAL OF AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. THAT IS WHY IT IS SO IMPORTANT FOR US TO SEE IF WE CANNOT RESOLVE THE THREE MAJOR REMAINING QUESTIONS. WE RECOGNISE THAT YOU ENVISAGE INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA BY THE END OF THE YEAR, AND THAT IS INDEED THE ASSUMPTION MADE IN OUR OWN PROPOSAL. WE HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT IN A MATTER OF SUCH PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE YOU WOULD NOT ALLOW YOURSELVES TO BE CONSTRICTED UNDULY BY DEADLINES. IF THE ORDERLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VARIOUS STEPS SET OUT IN OUR PROPOSAL WERE TO MEAN AN INDEPENDENCE DATE FOR NAMIBIA AFTER RATHER THAN BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR, THIS SMALL DELAY WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE WELL WORTHWHILE IF IN THE END THE PRIZE WAS A PEACEFUL

AND INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED TRANSITION TO STATEHOOD.

4. AS REGARDS THE RELEASE OF DETAINEES, ALL NAMIBIANS
DETAINED OR OTHERWISE OUTSIDE THE TERRITORY SHOULD BE
FREE TO RETURN AND PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS.
IN THIS REGARD, WE NOTE THAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE BE-
HIND THE SCENES CONCERNING THE RELEASE OF THOSE NAMIBIANS
DETAINED IN TANZANIA. IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER THERE
ARE ANY NAMIBIANS BEING HELD AGAINST THEIR WILL IN ZAMBIA.
OUR PROPOSAL REQUIRES THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, WITH
THE ASSISTANCE OF THE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

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FOR EMBASSY CAPETOWN

AND APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL BODIES, TO ENSURE THE VOLUN-
TARY CHOICE OF THOSE NAMIBIANS ELECTING TO REMAIN OUTSIDE
THE TERRITORY. OUR FIVE GOVERNMENTS WILL GIVE HIM THEIR
FULL BACKING. WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THIS, SUPPLEMENTED
BY OUR OWN REPRESENTATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED,
IS THE BEST POSSIBLE MECHANISM TO DEAL WITH NAMIBIANS

HELD IN TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA.

5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL AND
THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

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A WE HAD THOUGHT EARLIER THAT WE HAD ACHIEVED AN
UNDERSTANDING WITH YOU OVER THE NATURE OF THIS RELATION-
#80. WE NOW FIND THAT OUR VIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP HAS
BEEN QUESTIONED.

6. THERE ARE TWO POINTS WHICH SEEM WORTH MAKING. FIRST,
YOU APPEAR TO BE OPPOSED TO ANY WORDING WHICH MIGHT IM-
PLY THAT THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HAS THE FINAL SANCTION
OVER THE ACTIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL, IN SO FAR
AS THESE AFFECT THE POLITICAL PROCESS. OUR PROPOSAL
DELIBERATELY USES THE FORMULA, WHICH YOU HAVE ACCEPTED,
THAT THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD "SATISFY HIMSELF"
AS TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL WHICH
MIGHT AFFECT THE POLITICAL PROCESS. IT WAS ALWAYS OUR
UNDERSTANDING THAT IF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WAS NOT
SATISFIED, THE MEASURES ENVISAGED WOULD NOT COME INTO
EFFECT. WE DID NOT WANT TO SPELL THIS OUT IN TERMS WHICH
WOULD CAUSE YOU POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES. NOR DO WE WANT
TO GET INVOLVED IN A PROFITLESS ARGUMENT OVER JURISDICTION
IN NAMIBIA; OUR WHOLE INITIATIVE HAS BEEN AN ATTEMPT TO
AVOID RESURRECTING IRRECONCILABLE LEGAL POSITIONS. AS
WE SEE IT, THE VITAL FACTOR IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR
PROPOSAL WILL BE THE EXTENT OF THE PERSONAL RAPPORT BE-
TWEEN THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL AND THE SPECIAL REPRESEN-
TATIVE. THESE TWO OFFICIALS HAVE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT
FUNCTIONS, BUT WE WANT THEM TO WORK TOGETHER. WE HOPE
THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL WILL CONSULT THE SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE INFORMALLY BEFORE SUBMITTING FORMAL
PROPOSALS TO HIM IN CONNECTION WITH THE ELECTORAL PROCESS.
LIKEWISE WE HOPE THAT THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL
CONSULT THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL INFORMALLY WHEN, FOR
EXAMPLE, HE RECEIVES A COMPLAINT ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH
THE ELECTIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED. WE MUST, HOWEVER, RE-
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COGNIZE THAT IF WE ARE TO GAIN THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S
ENDORSEMENT OF OUR PROPOSAL AND OF THE EXISTENCE OF A DE
FACTO SOUTH AFRICAN ADMINISTRATION DURING THE TRANSITIONAL
PERIOD, WE CANNOT BE TOO IMPRECISE IN OUR LANGUAGE. THE

UNITED NATIONS WILL WANT TO BE ASSURED THAT THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL NOT BE PUT IN THE INVIDIOUS POSITION OF DISAGREEING WITH A PROPOSAL MADE BY THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL, BUT FINDING THAT IT IS NEVERTHELESS CARRIED OUT. IF THIS WERE WIDELY BELIEVED, OUR PROPOSAL WOULD NEVER GET OFF THE GROUND; AND EVEN IF IT DID, THE FIRST TIME THAT A MAJOR DISPUTE OCCURRED BETWEEN THE TWO OFFICIALS, THERE WOULD BE STRONG PRESSURE AT THE UNITED

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FOR EMBASSY CAPETOWN

NATIONS FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S MANDATE. THESE ARE THE POLITICAL REALITIES WITH WHICH WE HAVE TO DEAL. IN RESPONSE TO THE POINTS MR. FOURIE MADE, WE HAVE TRIED TO MAKE THE LANGUAGE OF THE RELEVANT SECTION OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF OUR PROPOSAL AS UNCONTROVERSIAL AS POSSIBLE. WE DO NOT BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT WE CAN OBTAIN THE PASSAGE OF A RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSING OUR PROPOSAL UNLESS WE SOMEHOW INDICATE THAT A

MEASURE CANNOT TAKE EFFECT IF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
OBJECTS TO IT.

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UM YOU HAVE SUGGESTED TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE
QUESTION; FIRST, THAT IN THE EVENT OF A DISPUTE BETWEEN
THE TWO OFFICIALS, THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD RE-
PORT ACCORDINGLY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL; AND SECONDLY,
THAT SOME MACHINERY SHOULD BE SET UP FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES BETWEEN THE TWO OFFICIALS. ON THE FIRST POINT,
WE SUGGEST THAT IT IS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST, INCLUDING
YOUR OWN, FOR EVERY DISPUTE TO BE REFERRED TO THE SECRETARY
GENERAL. IT WOULD BE HARD FOR THE LATTER TO OVERRIDE HIS
OWN REPRESENTATIVE IN THE FIELD, AND HE MIGHT FEEL IT
NECESSARY TO REFER THE DISPUTE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
THIS WOULD PROVIDE ENDLESS SCOPE FOR MISCHIEF-MAKING AND
FOR CRITICISM OF SOUTH AFRICA, AND IT IS OUR GENERAL BELIEF
THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD LET THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
GET ON WITH HIS JOB, AND THAT IT SHOULD MEET AS
LITTLE AS POSSIBLE TO DEBATE NAMIBIA DURING THE TRANSI-
TIONAL PERIOD. IN ANY CASE, IF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WERE
TO UPHOLD THE JUDGEMENT OF HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, THE
ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL WOULD EITHER HAVE TO RECONSIDER
HIS PROPOSAL, IN CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH WOULD MAKE IT FAR MORE DIFFICULT POLITICALLY
FOR HIM TO DO SO, OR TO CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN HIS POSITION,
WITH ALL THE IMPLICATIONS THIS WOULD HAVE FOR THE CONTIN-
UED INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE ELECTORAL
PROCESS.

8. THAT BRINGS US TO THE OTHER SUGGESTION WHICH YOU
HAVE RECENTLY PUT FORWARD, NAMELY A GENERAL DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT MACHINERY. WE HAVE NOT YET COME TO A CONCLU-
SION ON THIS MATTER. IN THEORY, IT IS NOT HARD TO CON-
CEIVE OF A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE MECHANISMS FOR A SETTLEMENT
OF DISPUTES BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL AND THE
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. HOWEVER, WE IMMEDIATELY RUN INTO
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THE PROBLEM WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY IDENTIFIED, NAMELY THAT
IF WE ARE TO SECURE SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSEMENT OF A
MANDATE FOR THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, IT WOULD BE HARD
IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVIDE AT THE SAME TIME FOR AN
ARBITER WHOM THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD REGARD AS HAVING
POWERS WHICH EXCEEDED THOSE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

AND OF THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL. IN ANY CASE, THE EXISTENCE OF A FORMALISED MACHINERY FOR SETTLING DISPUTES WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY PROVOKE A PROLIFERATION OF DISPUTES WE MIGHT SEE THE CONDUCT OF THE WHOLE POLITICAL PROCESS BEING TAKEN OUT OF THE HANDS OF THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL AND THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND WE WOULD FACE A STRING OF LEGAL OR QUASI-LEGAL ACTIONS WHICH WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY POISON THE ATMOSPHERE. WE AGAIN STRESS THAT THE BEST WAY OF ENSURING THE AVOIDANCE OF DISPUTES IN THE TERRITORY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS TO ENCOURAGE A GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL AND HIS STAFF, AND THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND HIS STAFF.

9. WE SHOULD BE INTERESTED TO HAVE YOUR OWN THOUGHTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMENTS WHICH WE HAVE JUST MADE. WE WANT TO EMPHASISE, HOWEVER, THAT OUR FIVE GOVERNMENTS ARE GOING TO MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION THROUGHOUT THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD; WE ARE NOT GOING TO WASH OUR HANDS OF THE BUSINESS ONCE THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS PASSED ITS RESOLUTION. THIS IS, AFTER ALL, OUR OWN PROPOSAL, AND SO FAR AS POSSIBLE, IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ELSEWHERE, WE SHALL DO OUR UTMOST TO MAKE SURE THAT ITS TERMS ARE FAITHFULLY CARRIED OUT. WE HOPE THIS WILL BE A REASSURANCE BOTH TO YOU AND TO OTHERS WHO ARE WORRIED ABOUT WHAT MAY HAPPEN DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

10. SIZE, DISPOSITION AND COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWAL OF

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FOR EMBASSY CAPETOWN

REMAINING SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES; SIZE AND FUNCTION OF UNTAG.

- THESE TWO QUESTIONS BOTH HAVE TO DO WITH THE MAINTEN-
ANCE OF LAW AND ORDER IN NAMIBIA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL
PERIOD. WE KNOW THAT THIS IS ONE OF YOUR MAIN CONCERNS;
IT IS ALSO ONE OF OURS.

11. WHEN WE PROPOSED THAT THE RESIDUAL SOUTH AFRICAN
FORCE SHOULD NUMBER 1500, AND SHOULD BE CONCENTRATED AT
GROOTFONTEIN OR OSHIVELLA OR BOTH, WE TOOK INTO ACCOUNT
A NUMBER OF FACTORS: --

A KA) SOUTH AFRICA'S DESIRE TO MAINTAIN A CONTINUING
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- MILITARY PRESENCE IN NAMIBIA DURING THE ELECTORAL
- CAMPAIGN;
- (B) THE POLITICAL NEED TO SATISFY THE UN THAT A
- RESIDUAL FORCE COULD NOT INTERFERE IN THE
- ELECTORAL PROCESS, BEARING IN MIND THE STRONG
- UNDERCURRENT OF OPINION AGAINST THE MAINTENANCE
- OF ANY SOUTH AFRICAN FORCE IN NAMIBIA.

12. YOUR OWN LAST PROPOSAL WAS FOR A RESIDUAL FORCE OF
3000 OF WHICH 1400 WOULD BE COMBAT TROOPS. WE SUGGESTED
TO YOU IN NEW YORK THAT IT WOULD BE WORTH EXAMINING WITH
THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE AUTHORITIES WHETHER THE SUPPORT
AND LOGISTIC FUNCTIONS, WHICH ACCOUNT FOR THE GREATER
PART OF THE 1600 ADDITIONAL MEN WHOM YOU REQUIRE, COULD
NOT BE CARRIED OUT BY CIVILIANS. MANY OF THESE MEN ARE
INTENDED TO SERVICE THE EIGHT PLATOONS WHOM YOU WANT TO
KEEP IN INSTALLATIONS ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDERS. UNDER
OUR PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, YOUR FORCE WOULD BE CONCENTRATED
AT GROOTFONTEIN AND/OR OSHIVELLO, WHICH ARE BOTH OUTSIDE
THE "OPERATIONAL AREA". COULD THESE BASES NOT BE SUPPLIED
FROM WINDHOEK BY CIVILIANS?

13. WE HAVE GIVEN A LOT OF THOUGHT TO THE BORDER QUESTION,
WHICH IS PROBABLY THE MOST DIFFICULT WITH WHICH WE HAVE TO
DEAL. WE CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE RETENTION BY YOU

OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS ALONG THE BORDER WOULD CREATE INSUPERABLE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES, BECAUSE MANY PEOPLE WOULD SEE THIS AS EVIDENCE OF YOUR INTENTION TO REINFORCE THE INSTALLATIONS AT A LATER DATE. SO FAR AS THE SECURITY OF THE INSTALLATIONS IS CONCERNED, WE HAVE EXPLICITLY PROVIDED FOR THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN CIVILIANS WHERE NECESSARY AND FOR UN PROTECTION OF THESE FACILITIES, AND YOU CAN REST ASSURED THAT WE SHALL USE OUR INFLUENCE TO

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SEE TO IT THAT THIS PROVISION IS OBSERVED.

14. THE REAL DILEMMA CONSISTS IN THE FACT THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE NORTH HAS RESTED IN RECENT YEARS WITH THE MILITARY RATHER THAN WITH THE POLICE. YOUR OWN PROPOSALS, HOWEVER, WOULD LEAVE THIS QUESTION UNRESOLVED. YOUR CONCERNS RAISE TWO SEPARATE QUESTIONS, THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER WITHIN THE TERRITORY, AND THE PREVENTION OF INFILTRATION FROM OUTSIDE. ON THE FIRST POINT, OUR PROPOSAL PROVIDES IN EFFECT FOR A THREE MONTH PERIOD FOR THE EMERGENCE OF SETTLED AND PEACEFUL CONDITIONS IN THE TERRITORY. THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL AND THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE ABLE TO ASSESS THE SITUATION AS IT DEVELOPS, AND TO TAKE WHATEVER MEASURES MAY BE NECESSARY TO THIS END. WE COULD ALSO CONSIDER THE STRENGTHENING OF THE EXISTING POLICE FORCE IN NAMIBIA, WHICH THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE MIGHT HIMSELF WELCOME. THIS IS, HOWEVER, A DELICATE MATTER WHICH WE WOULD PREFER TO LEAVE TO THE ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL AND TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

15. AS REGARDS INFILTRATION FROM OUTSIDE NAMIBIA, WE NEED TO PURSUE OUR TALKS WITH THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT. YOU PROBABLY KNOW ALREADY THAT THE US AND UK REPRESENTATIVES IN LAGOS VISITED ANGOLA, ON BEHALF OF OUR FIVE GOVERNMENTS, EARLY IN FEBRUARY. THEY WERE ABLE TO CLEAR UP A NUMBER OF MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT OUR PROPOSAL, AND ALSO TO SOUND OUT ANGOLAN THINKING ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH SWAPO FORCES IN ANGOLA COULD BE CONTROLLED DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. PRESIDENT NETO'S RESPONSE WAS CAUTIOUS BUT NOT WHOLLY DISMISSIVE. HE TOLD OUR EMISSARIES THAT THERE HAD BEEN EARLIER TALKS BETWEEN YOUR GOVERNMENT AND HIS ABOUT THE CREATION OF A 50 KM BUFFER ZONE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER. ACCORDING TO THE ANGOLANS, THEY HAD BEEN READY TO CONSIDER THIS, BUT YOU HAD ASKED TO RETAIN FOUR BASES ON THE NAMIBIAN SIDE.

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16. WE RAISED THIS QUESTION WITH THE ANGOLAN DELEGATION
AT THE NEW YORK PROXIMITY TALKS. WE PUT IT TO THE
ANGOLANS THAT OUR PROPOSAL ENVISAGED WITHDRAWAL OF ALL

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FOR EMBASSY CAPETOWN

SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM THE BORDER THREE MONTHS AFTER
THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, AND ASKED WHETHER IN THOSE
CIRCUMSTANCES THERE WAS NOT A CASE FOR REVIVING THEIR
GOVERNMENT'S TALKS WITH YOU ABOUT A BUFFER ZONE. THEY
SHOWED THEMSELVES RELUCTANT TO CONSIDER THE PERMANENT
STATIONING OF UN OFFICIALS IN ANGOLA, BUT INDICATED THAT
WHAT THEY CALLED A NO-GO BORDER AREA WAS NOT EXCLUDED; AND
THEY ASSUMED THAT UN OFFICIALS AT THE DESIGNATED BORDER
CROSSINGS COULD TALK DIRECTLY TO THEIR ANGOLAN COUNTERPARTS
ABOUT ANY PROBLEMS WHICH AROSE IN MAINTAINING SUCH A BUFFER

ZONE. WE PROPOSE TO TAKE THIS MATTER UP AGAIN WITH PRESI-
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DENT NETO IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THIS IDEA DOES NOT GO AS FAR AS YOU MIGHT LIKE. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS AN IDEA ON WHICH WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO BUILD AS THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD PROCEEDED, FOR EXAMPLE BY OBTAINING ANGOLAN AGREEMENT TO A UN LIAISON OFFICE IN LUANDA. NO DOUBT SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES WOULD ALSO BE STATIONED AT THE BORDER CROSSINGS. IN OUR VIEW, ANGOLA HAS ITS OWN INTERESTS TO CONSIDER IN THIS MATTER, AND WE ARE ANXIOUS THAT THE ANGOLANS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE INVOLVED IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS (IF BOTHA REFERS TO INFILTRATION FROM ZAMBIA, WE WOULD REPLY THAT WE SHALL, OF COURSE, BE SEEKING ZAMBIAN COOPERATION AS WELL.

17. AS REGARDS THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY CONTINGENT, OUR PROPOSAL, LEAVING ITS SIZE UNDEFINED, WAS DESIGNED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF YOUR POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES OVER THE PROPOSITION THAT THE SIZE OF THE UN MILITARY CONTINGENT SHOULD EXCEED THAT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESIDUAL FORCE. WE NOW LEAVE IT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DETERMINE THE SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE UN MILITARY CONTINGENT. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT HE WILL CARRY OUT HIS DUTIES HONESTLY AND NEUTRALLY. WE WOULD EXPECT HIM TO DEVELOP HIS PLANS IN CONSULTATION WITH YOU AND WITH APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES IN NAMIBIA. WE ARE PREPARED TO USE OUR INFLUENCE IN THESE MATTERS.

18. WE HAD A HARD TIME TRYING TO PERSUADE THE INTERNAL NAMIBIAN PARTIES WHO SENT DELEGATIONS TO NEW YORK THAT THE UN WOULD BE A NEUTRAL BODY. BUT YOU KNOW, AS WELL AS WE DO, THAT A UN MANDATE BASED UPON A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WOULD BE QUITE DIFFERENT FROM ONE BASED ON AN ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION. THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS NEVER ENDORSED THE PROPOSITION THAT SWAPO IS THE SOLE AND AUTHEN-
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TIC REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NAMIBIAN PEOPLE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE UN PERSONNEL IN NAMIBIA WILL DISCHARGE THEIR DUTIES FAITHFULLY AND IMPARTIALLY. AS MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WE SHALL BE KEEPING A CLOSE WATCH ON THE SITUATION.

19. IN CONCLUSION, WE REMAIN HOPEFUL ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT. THAT IS WHY IT IS SO IMPORTANT TO DAMP

DOWN TENSION AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE. WE HAVE ALREADY
THIS WEEK URGED SWAPO TO SHOW RESTRAINT IN ITS ACTIVITIES
ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER, AND WE HAVE WARNED THEM THAT
ILL-TREATMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIER WHOM THEY HAVE
CAPTURED WILL CERTAINLY REDUCE THE CHANCES OF AN
EARLY SETTLEMENT. IN THE SAME SPIRIT, WE HOPE THAT YOUR
GOVERNMENT WILL EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THE BORDER AREAS
AND REFRAIN FROM TAKING UNILATERAL ACTION WHICH COULD
INTERRUPT OR PREVENT FURTHER PROGRESS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS.
YOUNG

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, MEETING AGENDA, NEGOTIATIONS, BRIEFING MATERIALS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 02 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978USUNN00720
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780095-0290
Format: TEL
From: USUN NEW YORK
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197803112/aaaadrqo.tel
Line Count: 612
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 8cc7bab9-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION IO
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 12
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 13 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3135878
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NAMIBIA: DRAFT TALKING POINTS FOR INFORMAL MEETING WITH BOTHA FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS WERE DRAFTED BY CONTACT G
TAGS: PORG, SF, WA, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/8cc7bab9-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014